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Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening

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  • Andrei Barbos

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of South Florida)

Abstract

This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specifcation, an increase in the submis- sion fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of South Florida, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0613.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Journal of Economics
Handle: RePEc:usf:wpaper:0613

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Keywords: Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden;

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References

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  1. Ralph Boleslavsky & Christopher Cotton, 2011. "Learning More by Doing Less," Working Papers 2011-6, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
  2. Christopher Cotton, 2013. "Submission Fees and Response Times in Academic Publishing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 501-09, February.
  3. Curtis R. Taylor & Huseyin Yildirim, 2011. "Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(2), pages 762-794.
  4. Andrei Barbos, 2013. "Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation," Working Papers 0913, University of South Florida, Department of Economics.
  5. Derek Leslie, 2005. "Are Delays in Academic Publishing Necessary?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 407-413, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Barbos, Andrei, 2012. "Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation," MPRA Paper 40848, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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