Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Employment Protection, Product Market Regulation and Firm Selection

Contents:

Author Info

  • Winfried Koeniger

    ()

  • Julien Prat

    ()

Abstract

Why are firm and job turnover rates so similar across OECD countries? We argue that this may be due to the joint regulation of product and labor markets. For our analysis, we build a stochastic equilibrium model with search frictions and heterogeneous multiple-worker firms. This allows us to distinguish firm entry and exit from hiring and firing in a model with equilibrium unemployment. We show that firing costs, sunk entry costs and bureaucratic flow costs have countervailing effects on firm and job turnover as different types of firms select to operate in the market.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.uu.nl/faculty/leg/NL/organisatie/departementen/departementeconomie/onderzoek/publicaties/DParchive/2007/Documents/07-03.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Utrecht School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-03.

as in new window
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0703

Contact details of provider:
Postal: P.O. Box 80125, NL-3508 TC Utrecht
Phone: +31 30 253 9800
Fax: +31 30 253 7373
Email:
Web page: http://www.uu.nl/EN/faculties/leg/organisation/schools/schoolofeconomicsuse/Pages/default.aspx
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: Firing Cost; Product Market Regulation; Firm Selection; Firm Turnover; Job Turnover; Unemployment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Carmen Pagés-Serra & Alejandro Micco, 2008. "The Economic Effects of Employment Protection: Evidence from International Industry-Level Data," Research Department Publications 4496, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  2. Pedro Portugal & Olivier Blanchard, 2001. "What Hides Behind an Unemployment Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 187-207, March.
  3. O Blanchard & A Landier, 2002. "The Perverse Effects of Partial Labour Market Reform: fixed--Term Contracts in France," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F214-F244, June.
  4. Bartelsman, Eric & Haltiwanger, John & Scarpetta1, Stefano, 2004. "Microeconomic evidence of creative destruction in industrial and developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3464, The World Bank.
  5. Katharine G. Abraham & Robert Shimer, 2001. "Changes in Unemployment Duration and Labor Force Attachment," NBER Working Papers 8513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Christian Haefke & Monique Ebell, 2004. "The Missing Link: Product Market Regulation, Collective Bargaining and the European Unemployment Puzzle," 2004 Meeting Papers 759, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. William Kerr & Adriana Kugler & David Autor, 2007. "Do Employment Protections Reduce Productivity? Evidence from U.S. States," Working Papers 07-04, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
  8. Giuseppe Bertola & Ricardo J. Caballero, 1993. "Cross Sectional Efficiency and Labor Hoarding in an Matching Model of Unemployment," NBER Working Papers 4472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Dale T Mortensen & Christopher Pissarides, 2001. "Taxes, subsidies and equilibrium labor market outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2075, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  10. Bertrand, Marianne & Kramarz, Francis, 2002. "Does Entry Regulation Hinder Job Creation? Evidence from the French Retail Industry," IZA Discussion Papers 415, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Smith, Eric, 1994. "Search, Concave Production, and Optimal Firm Size," CEPR Discussion Papers 882, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Cahuc, Pierre & Wasmer, Etienne, 2001. "Does Intrafirm Bargaining Matter In The Large Firm'S Matching Model?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(05), pages 742-747, November.
  13. Giuseppe Bertola & Richard Rogerson, 1996. "Institutions and Labor Reallocation," NBER Working Papers 5828, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Alesina, Alberto F & Ardagna, Silvia & Nicoletti, Giorgio & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 2003. "Regulation and Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 3851, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Bertola, Giuseppe & Garibaldi, Pietro, 2000. "Wages and the Size of Firms in Dynamic Matching Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 2576, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Julián Messina & Giovanna Vallanti, 2007. "Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence from Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 279-301, 06.
  17. Haltiwanger, John & Scarpetta, Stefano & Schweiger, Helena, 2006. "Assessing job flows across countries : the role of industry, firm size, and regulations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4070, The World Bank.
  18. Olivier Blanchard & Francesco Giavazzi, 2001. "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 8120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
  20. Björn Brügemann, 2007. "Employment protection: Tough to scrap or tough to get?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 386-415, 06.
  21. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March.
  22. repec:cup:macdyn:v:5:y:2002:i:05:p:742-747_03 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Rogerson, Richard, 1993. "Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 915-38, October.
  24. Paloma Lopez-Garcia, 2002. "Labour market performance and start-up costs: OECD evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20059, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  25. Ebell, Monique & Haefke, Christian, 2006. "Product Market Regulation and Endogenous Union Formation," IZA Discussion Papers 2222, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  26. Samaniego, Roberto M., 2006. "Do Firing Costs Affect The Incidence Of Firm Bankruptcy?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(04), pages 467-501, September.
  27. Fonseca, Raquel & Lopez-Garcia, Paloma & Pissarides, Christopher A., 2001. "Entrepreneurship, start-up costs and employment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 692-705, May.
  28. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1995. "The European unemployment dilemma," Working Paper Series, Macroeconomic Issues 95-17, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  29. Garibaldi, Pietro & Violante, Giovanni L, 2004. "The Employment Effects of Severance Payments with Wage Rigidities," CEPR Discussion Papers 4608, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  30. Michael Pries & Richard Rogerson, 2005. "Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market Flows," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 811-839, August.
  31. Cahuc, Pierre & Marque, François & Wasmer, Etienne, 2004. "A Theory of Wages and Labour Demand with Intra-firm Bargaining and Matching Frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 4605, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  32. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 195-222, March.
  33. John M. Abowd & Patrick Corbel & Francis Kramarz, 1999. "The Entry And Exit Of Workers And The Growth Of Employment: An Analysis Of French Establishments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 170-187, May.
  34. Davis, Steven J. & Haltiwanger, John, 1999. "Gross job flows," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 2711-2805 Elsevier.
  35. Christopher J. Flinn, 2006. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search, Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1013-1062, 07.
  36. David H. Autor & John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, 2003. "The Costs of Wrongful-Discharge Laws," NBER Working Papers 9425, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  37. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
  38. repec:dgr:uvatin:2004114 is not listed on IDEAS
  39. Steven J. Davis & John C. Haltiwanger & Scott Schuh, 1998. "Job Creation and Destruction," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262540932, December.
  40. Stole, Lars A & Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410, July.
  41. Lawrence M. Kahn, 2007. "The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns: International Microeconomic Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(521), pages 333-356, 06.
  42. Robert E. Hall, 2005. "Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 50-65, March.
  43. Giuseppe Nicoletti & Stefano Scarpetta & Olivier Boylaud, 2000. "Summary Indicators of Product Market Regulation with an Extension to Employment Protection Legislation," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 226, OECD Publishing.
  44. Bentolila, Samuel & Bertola, Giuseppe, 1990. "Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad Is Eurosclerosis?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 381-402, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:0703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marina Muilwijk).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.