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Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core

Author

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  • Atay, Ata
  • Llerena Garrés, Francesc
  • Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)

Abstract

A class of three-sided markets (and games) is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we analyze the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff To this end, we introduce the derived market (and game) and relate it to the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. These markets may have an empty core, but we define a balanced subclass, where the worth of each triplet is defined as the addition of the worths of the pairs it contains. Keywords: Multi-sided assignment market, Consistency, Core, Nucleolus. JEL Classification: C71, C78

Suggested Citation

  • Atay, Ata & Llerena Garrés, Francesc & Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva), 2014. "Generalized three-sided assignment markets: consistency and the core," Working Papers 2072/246962, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/246962
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    Keywords

    Jocs cooperatius; 33 - Economia;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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