The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core
AbstractIn this paper, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten, 1978) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta-Ray, 1991). Both results are based on a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. Keywords: Cooperative game, equity core, equal division core, Lorenz domination. JEL classification: C71
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/212194.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Jocs cooperatius; 33 - Economia;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1991. "Constrained egalitarian allocations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 403-422, November.
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