Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability
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- Doh-Shin Jeon & Domenico Menicucci, 2006. "Building an Honest Microfinance Organization: Embezzlement and the Optimality of Rigid Repayment Schedules and Joint Liability," Working Papers 272, Barcelona School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
Microfinance; Group Lending; Joint Liability; Embezzlement; Hierarchy; Contract;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-FIN-2005-10-15 (Finance)
- NEP-IAS-2005-10-15 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-MFD-2005-10-15 (Microfinance)
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