This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On the Origins of Electoral Systems and Political Parties. The Role of Elections in Multi-Member Districts

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Josep M. Colomer ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The old, understudied electoral system composed of multi-member districts, open ballot and plurality rule is presented as the most remote scene of the origin of both political parties and new electoral systems. A survey of the uses of this set of electoral rules in different parts of the world during remote and recent periods shows its wide spread. A model of voting by this electoral system demonstrates that, while it can produce varied and pluralistic representation, it also provides incentives to form factional or partisan candidacies. Famous negative reactions to the emergence of factions and political parties during the 18th and 19th centuries are reinterpreted in this context. Many electoral rules and procedures invented since the second half of the 19th century, including the Australian ballot, single-member districts, limited and cumulative ballots, and proportional representation rules, derived from the search to reduce the effects of the ‘originating’ multi-member district system in favor of a single party sweep. The general relations between political parties and electoral systems are restated to account for the foundational stage here discussed.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/papers/downloads/814.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: Whole Paper
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 814.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:814

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Political parties; electoral systems; multimember districts;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  2. Weber, Robert J, 1995. "Approval Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 39-49, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.