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Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

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  • Enriqueta Aragonés
  • Andrew Postlewaite

Abstract

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaign rhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over what policy the candidate will implement in case he wins the election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaign promises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises are believed by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtain that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 525.

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Date of creation: Sep 2000
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:525

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

Related research

Keywords: Electoral campaigns; reputation; commitment;

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Cited by:
  1. Casamatta Georges & Sand-Zantman Wilfried, 2006. "Citizen Candidacy With Asymmetric Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-41, February.
  2. Casamatta, Georges & De Donder, Philippe, 2003. "On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 161, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Keefer, Philip & Vlaicu, Razvan, 2005. "Democracy, credibility and clientelism," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3472, The World Bank.

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