We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests its predictions. The model provides conditions for the existence of credit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seem to be good approximations of the experimental results.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number
351.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: