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Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

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  • Enriqueta Aragonés

Abstract

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economic performance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies, and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation of political parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Suggested Citation

  • Enriqueta Aragonés, 1994. "Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition," Economics Working Papers 273, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1997.
  • Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Enriqueta Aragones, 1997. "Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(2), pages 189-210, April.
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    8. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Negativity effect; ideology; party formation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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