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Efficient interval scoring rules

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  • Karl Schlag
  • Joël van der Weele

Abstract

Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefs are time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are valid only when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a class of rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) on the basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulate an e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single- peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of the belief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1176.

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Date of creation: Oct 2009
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:1176

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Keywords: Belief elicitation; scoring rules; subjective probabilities;

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References

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  1. Rutstrom, E. Elizabet & Wilcox, Nathaniel, 2008. "Stated versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test," MPRA Paper 11852, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Huck, Steffen & Weizsacker, Georg, 2002. "Do players correctly estimate what others do? : Evidence of conservatism in beliefs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 71-85, January.
  3. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February.
  4. repec:bla:restud:v:76:y:2009:i:4:p:1461-1489 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Croson, Rachel T. A., 2000. "Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 299-314, March.
  6. Reinhard Selten & Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Klaus Abbink, 1999. "Money Does Not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do even Worse," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 213-252, June.
  7. Schmalensee, Richard, 1976. "An Experimental Study of Expectation Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 17-41, January.
  8. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joël van der Weele, 2009. "Can sanctions induce pessimism? An experiment," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 1150, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  9. Theo Offerman & Joep Sonnemans & Gijs Van De Kuilen & Peter P. Wakker, 2009. "A Truth Serum for Non-Bayesians: Correcting Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes ," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1461-1489.
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Cited by:
  1. Cettolin Elena & Riedl Arno, 2011. "Partial coercion, conditional cooperation, and self-commitment in voluntary contributions to public goods," Research Memorandum 041, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. Roberto Galbiati & Karl Schlag & Joel van der Weele, 2011. "Sanctions that Signal: an Experiment," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics 1107, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  3. Michał Krawczyk, 2011. "Overconfident for real? Proper scoring for confidence intervals," Working Papers 2011-15, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.

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