A characterization of sequential rationalizability
AbstractA choice function is sequentially rationalizable if there is an ordered collection of asymmetric binary relations that identifies the selected alternative in every choice problem. We propose a property, F-consistency, and show that it characterizes the notion of sequential rationalizability. F-consistency is a testable property that highlights the behavioral aspects implicit in sequentially rationalizable choice. Further, our characterization result provides a novel tool with which to study how other behavioral concepts are related to sequential rationalizability, and establish a priori unexpected implications. In particular, we show that the concept of rationalizability by game trees, which, in principle, had little to do with sequential rationalizability, is a refinement of the latter. Every choice function that is rationalizable by a game tree is also sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 1089.
Date of creation: May 2008
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Individual rationality; Rationalizability; Consistency; Bounded rationality; Behavioral economics; Voting;
Other versions of this item:
- Jose Apesteguia & Miguel A. Ballester, 2008. "A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability," Working Papers 345, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2008-05-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-UPT-2008-05-24 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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CCES Discussion Paper Series
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