Profit and Non-Profit Maximising Network Density, Membership Fees and Service in Monopolistic and Duopolistic Framework
AbstractNetwork density, membership fees and service are analytically related to factors such as the size of the target population, the distribution of ability to enjoy the networl's service within target population, the tax-regbate on membership payment, the service production costs, which are increased by congestion or reduced by agglomeration, and the network organisational costs. The analysis is conducted for the case of budget-balancing and density-targeting networks.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia in its series Economics Working Papers with number wp99-2.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
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Postal: School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia
Phone: +612 4221-3659
Fax: +612 4221-3725
Web page: http://business.uow.edu.au/econ/index.html
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ENTERPRISES ; INDUSTRY ; MEMBERSHIP;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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