Lemons on the Web: A Signalling Approach to the Problem of Trust in Internet Commerce
AbstractAsymmetric information is at the heart of situations involving trust. In the case of B2C Internet commerce, the information asymmetry typically relates to the difficulty that consumers have of distinguishing between "trustworthy" and "untrustworthy" Web merchants. The impasse can be resolved by the use of signals by trustworthy Web merchants to differentiate themselves from untrustworthy ones. Using an experimental design where subjects are exposed to a series of purchase choices, we investigate three possible signals, an unconditional money-back guarantee, branding, and privacy statement, and test their efficacy. Our empirical results confirm the predictions suggested by signalling theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia in its series Economics Working Papers with number wp04-10.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
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Postal: School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia
Phone: +612 4221-3659
Fax: +612 4221-3725
Web page: http://www.uow.edu.au/commerce/econ/
More information through EDIRC
trust (social behaviour); consumer behaviour;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-11-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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