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Lemons on the Web: A Signalling Approach to the Problem of Trust in Internet Commerce

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Author Info
Lee, Boon-Chye () (University of Wollongong)
Ang, Lawrence () (Macquarie Graduate School of Management)
Dubelaar, Chris () (Monash University)
Abstract

Asymmetric information is at the heart of situations involving trust. In the case of B2C Internet commerce, the information asymmetry typically relates to the difficulty that consumers have of distinguishing between "trustworthy" and "untrustworthy" Web merchants. The impasse can be resolved by the use of signals by trustworthy Web merchants to differentiate themselves from untrustworthy ones. Using an experimental design where subjects are exposed to a series of purchase choices, we investigate three possible signals, an unconditional money-back guarantee, branding, and privacy statement, and test their efficacy. Our empirical results confirm the predictions suggested by signalling theory.

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File URL: http://www.uow.edu.au/content/groups/public/@web/@commerce/@econ/documents/doc/uow012171.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia in its series Economics Working Papers with number wp04-10.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uow:depec1:wp04-10

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Postal: School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia
Phone: +612 4221-3663
Fax: +612 4221-3725
Web page: http://www.uow.edu.au/commerce/econ/
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Related research
Keywords: trust (social behaviour); consumer behaviour;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Boulding, William & Kirmani, Amna, 1993. " A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?," Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 111-23, June.
  2. Wiener, Joshua Lyle, 1985. " Are Warranties Accurate Signals of Product Reliability?," Journal of Consumer Research: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(2), pages 245-50, September.
  3. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  4. Ippolito, Pauline M, 1990. "Bonding and Nonbonding Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 41-60, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Price, Lydia J. & Dawar, Niraj, 2002. "The joint effects of brands and warranties in signaling new product quality," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 165-190, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Li, Zhan G. & Gery, Nurit, 2000. "E-tailing--For all products?," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 49-54. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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