Conflict, Political Structure and Economic Growth in Dual-Population Lands
AbstractThe optimal consumption growth rate for a group in a strictly political federation in a dual-population land is lower than that under partition if the group is wealthier and has a lower population growth rate than its counterpart. Even in such circumstances the group may economically benefit from joining a federation that facilitates technological transfer as long as the group’s initial technology is inferior to the hybrid. The group’s optimal consumption growth rate during a civil war is larger than those under partition and a strictly political federation if its rival’s warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia in its series Economics Working Papers with number wp02-19.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
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Postal: School of Economics, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong NSW 2522 Australia
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More information through EDIRC
conflict; political structure; economic growth;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-12-17 (All new papers)
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