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Conflict, Political Structure and Economic Growth in Dual-Population Lands

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Abstract

The optimal consumption growth rate for a group in a strictly political federation in a dual-population land is lower than that under partition if the group is wealthier and has a lower population growth rate than its counterpart. Even in such circumstances the group may economically benefit from joining a federation that facilitates technological transfer as long as the group’s initial technology is inferior to the hybrid. The group’s optimal consumption growth rate during a civil war is larger than those under partition and a strictly political federation if its rival’s warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties.

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  • Levy, Amnon & Faria, João Ricardo, 2002. "Conflict, Political Structure and Economic Growth in Dual-Population Lands," Economics Working Papers wp02-19, School of Economics, University of Wollongong, NSW, Australia.
    • Handle: RePEc:uow:depec1:wp02-19
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conflict; political structure; economic growth;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J19 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Other
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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