Political Connections and Investment in Rural Vietnam
Abstract
This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power on farmers. agricultural investment decisions. Our main result is that households significantly increase their investment in land improvement as a result of relatives moving into public office. Connections to office holders appear to be important for investment because they strengthen de facto land property rights and improve access to off-farm employment and to informal loans. The findings underline the importance of informal networks for economic behaviour in environments with developing institutions and markets. They also suggest the presence of an untapped potential for economic development: if households without connections could obtain equally strong property rights and accessto credit and insurance as the well-connected households, investment levels would risesubstantially.Download Info
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Papers with number UNU-WIDER Working Paper WP2011/037.Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2011-037
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Related research
Keywords: political connections; informal networks; land property rights; investment; credit; Vietnam;This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2011-07-27 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2011-07-27 (Development)
- NEP-MFD-2011-07-27 (Microfinance)
- NEP-POL-2011-07-27 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2011-07-27 (Transition Economics)
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2011.
"One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy,"
Working Papers
18-2011, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
- Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2012. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy," Working Papers 07-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
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