Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Political Connections and Investment in Rural Vietnam

Contents:

Author Info

  • Finn Tarp
  • Thomas Markussen

Abstract

This paper uses household panel data from rural Vietnam to explore the effects of having a relative in a position of political or bureaucratic power on farmers. agricultural investment decisions. Our main result is that households significantly increase their investment in land improvement as a result of relatives moving into public office. Connections to office holders appear to be important for investment because they strengthen de facto land property rights and improve access to off-farm employment and to informal loans. The findings underline the importance of informal networks for economic behaviour in environments with developing institutions and markets. They also suggest the presence of an untapped potential for economic development: if households without connections could obtain equally strong property rights and accessto credit and insurance as the well-connected households, investment levels would risesubstantially.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/wp2011/wp2011-037.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number UNU-WIDER Working Paper WP2011/037.

as in new window
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2011-037

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Katajanokanlaituri 6B, 00160 Helsinki
Phone: +358-9-6159911
Fax: +358-9-61599333
Email:
Web page: http://www.wider.unu.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: political connections; informal networks; land property rights; investment; credit; Vietnam;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Becker, Gary S., 1971. "The Economics of Discrimination," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226041162, June.
  2. Richard Hornbeck, 2010. "Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(2), pages 767-810, May.
  3. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2007. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," IZA Discussion Papers 2836, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2009. "Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 7114, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. MICHAEL R. CARTER & Pedro Olinto, 2000. "Getting Institutions 'Right' for Whom: Credit Constraints and the Impact of Property Rights on the Quantity and Compostiton of Investment," Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 433, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
  6. Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, 2008. "Land Sales and Rental Markets in Transition: Evidence from Rural Vietnam," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 70(1), pages 67-101, 02.
  7. Markussen, Thomas & Tarp, Finn & Van Den Broeck, Katleen, 2011. "The Forgotten Property Rights: Evidence on Land Use Rights in Vietnam," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 839-850, May.
  8. Pingali, Prabhu L & Xuan, Vo-Tong, 1992. "Vietnam: Decollectivization and Rice Productivity Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(4), pages 697-718, July.
  9. Alston, Lee J & Libecap, Gary D & Schneider, Robert, 1996. "The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 25-61, April.
  10. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
  11. Markus Goldstein & Christopher Udry, 2005. "The Profits of Power: Land Rights and Agricultural Investment in Ghana," Working Papers 929, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
  12. Hanan G. Jacoby & Guo Li & Scott Rozelle, 2002. "Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1420-1447, December.
  13. Honore, Bo E, 1992. "Trimmed LAD and Least Squares Estimation of Truncated and Censored Regression Models with Fixed Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 533-65, May.
  14. Quy-Toan Do & Lakshmi Iyer, 2008. "Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56, pages 531-579.
  15. Martin Ravallion & Dominique van de Walle, 2004. "Breaking up the collective farms," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(2), pages 201-236, 06.
  16. Ravallion, Martin & van de Walle, Dominique, 2006. "Does rising landlessness signal success or failure for Vietnam's agrarian transition?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3871, The World Bank.
  17. Brasselle, Anne-Sophie & Gaspart, Frederic & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2002. "Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 373-418, April.
  18. Narayan, Deepa & Pritchett, Lant, 1999. "Cents and Sociability: Household Income and Social Capital in Rural Tanzania," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(4), pages 871-97, July.
  19. Dilip Mookherjee & Pranab K. Bardhan, 2000. "Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 135-139, May.
  20. Hornbeck, Richard A., 2010. "Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development," Scholarly Articles 11185832, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  21. Martin Ravallion & Dominique van de Walle, 2006. "Land Reallocation in an Agrarian Transition," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(514), pages 924-942, October.
  22. Hanan G. Jacoby & Ghazala Mansuri, 2008. "Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 763-788.
  23. Asim Ijaz Khwaja & Atif Mian, 2005. "Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Quoc-Anh Do & Anh Tran, 2012. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Infrastructure and Nepotism in an Autocracy," Working Papers 07-2012, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
  2. Quoc-Anh Do & Kieu-Trang Nguyen & Anh N. Tran, 2013. "One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime," Sciences Po publications 13, Sciences Po.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2011-037. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruck Tadesse).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.