Elites and Institutional Persistence
AbstractParticular sets of institutions, once they become established in a society, have a strong tendency to persist. In this paper I argue that understanding how elites form and reproduce is key to understanding the persistence of institutions over time. I illustrate this idea with a simple political economy theory of institutions and through examples from Liberia, the US, South Africa and Germany I show how elites influence institutions. To change institutions requires having an understanding of how reforms influence the preferences, capabilities and strategies of elites.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Paper Series with number wp2010-85.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
elites; political economy; persistence of institutions;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2010-09-03 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-POL-2010-09-03 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-09-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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