Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam
Abstract
This paper uses a unique panel dataset on firm-level corruption. It contains quantitative information on bribe payments by a sample of formal and informal Vietnamese firms. We show that bribe incidence is highly associated with firm-level differences in (i) visibility, (ii) sunk costs, (iii) ability to pay, and (iv) level of interaction with public officials. Moreover, when informal firms become formal the probability of paying bribes increases. Becoming formal is also associated with a revenue growth premium that is not driven by self-selection of well-performing firms. On average, this premium outweighs the additional bribe cost of formalization. Formalization embodies net benefits in spite of the growth hampering effects of bribes.Download Info
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Paper provided by World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) in its series Working Papers with number UNU-WIDER Working Paper WP2010/16.Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2010-16
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Related research
Keywords: firm performance; corruption; Vietnam;Other versions of this item:
- John Rand & Finn Tarp, 2012. "Firm-Level Corruption in Vietnam," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(3), pages 571 - 595.
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2010-03-13 (Development)
- NEP-TRA-2010-03-13 (Transition Economics)
References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- O.Toole, Conor M. & Tarp, Finn, 2012. "Corruption and the Efficiency of Capital Investment in Developing Countries," Working Papers UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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