Kidnap Insurance and its Impact on Kidnapping Outcomes
AbstractIn the developing world, kidnapping is relatively common, and a market for kidnap insurance has arisen in response. We provide a model that allows us to analyze how kidnap insurance affects the interaction between the kidnapper and the victim’s family when both are self-interested and have complete knowledge. We find that a market for kidnap insurance can be supported because it benefits a risk averse family, as long as the introduction of insurance does not increase the risk of kidnapping too much. Families should fully insure if purchasing insurance does not increase the probability of kidnapping, and partially insure otherwise. Kidnapping insurance allows families to redeem hostages from kidnappers who are more willing to kill, which reduces the number of kidnapping fatalities as long as the insurance does not increase the risk of kidnapping too much.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 13-001.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rony Pshisva & Gustavo A. Suarez, 2006. "'Captive markets': the impact of kidnappings on corporate investment in Colombia," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2006-18, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Catherine Rodriguez & Edgar Villa, 2012. "Kidnap risks and migration: evidence from Colombia," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 1139-1164, July.
- Atkinson, Scott E & Sandler, Todd & Tschirhart, John, 1987. "Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, April.
- Lapan, Harvey E & Sandler, Todd, 1988.
"To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That Is the Question,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 16-21, May.
- Lapan, Harvey E. & Sandler, Todd, 1988. "To Bargain or Not to Bargain: That is the Question," Staff General Research Papers 10817, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- M. Vannini & B. McCannon & C. Detotto, 2012. "Understanding Ransom Kidnapping and Its Duration," Working Paper CRENoS 201219, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- Bertrand Crettez & Régis Deloche, 2009. "A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 3(2), pages 123-139, June.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mehmet Tosun).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.