Patience Versus Decisiveness in Decision-Making
AbstractWhen rationality is bounded, a variety of factors may influence how far a choice is from optimal. We examine the willingness to search among alternatives. We find fixed individual differences in this temperament measure. People may be usefully typed according to how they obtain improved choices. More patient subjects obtain improvement by effectively using decision resources, performing better when the decision is more complex. More decisive subjects obtain improvement by conserving valuable decision resources, performing better when the decision problem is simple. We find that a bonus incentive frame encourages patience, while a penalty frame encourages decisiveness. These results suggest an organization can enhance its performance by matching individual temperaments and incentive frames to decision tasks at hand.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics & University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 07-004.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2007
Date of revision:
framing; deliberation cost; bounded rationality; heuristics; incentives;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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