On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences
AbstractIn a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a polytope inthe Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the polytope. Asingle-best point is a point which is the unique point at maximal distance from some other pointof the polytope. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is a dictatorshipunless the polytope has exactly two single-best points or it has exactly four single-best pointswhich form the vertices of a rectangle. In the latter cases strategy-proof and Pareto optimalrules can be obtained by committee voting (simple games) between the single-best alternatives.This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclearplants have to be located within a confined region.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR) in its series Research Memorandum with number 041.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
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- Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013.
Cahiers de recherche
04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Bossert W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013. "Single-basined choice," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- BOSSERT, Walter & PETERS, Hans, 2013. "Single-basined choice," Cahiers de recherche 2013-03, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Öztürk Murat & Peters Hans & Storcken Ton, 2012.
"Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc,"
042, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
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