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Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

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Author Info
Vareda, João

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Abstract

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant's decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to convince the regulator that it needs cheap access in the future, the regulator must set access prices which tend to be distorted (lower or higher) as compared to ?rst best. Still, this is better than committing to ignore ex post demand information. Consulting the entrant earlier about its expectations improves welfare and may help to achieve the first best.

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File URL: http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2007/wp525.pdf
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Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp525.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp525

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  1. Bourreau, Marc & Dogan, Pinar, 2005. "Unbundling the local loop," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 173-199, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Vareda, João, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp526, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Paula Sarmento, 2003. "Entry Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand: A Signalling Model Approach," CETE Discussion Papers 0304, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto. [Downloadable!]
  6. João Vareda, 2007. "Unbundling and Incumbent Investment in Quality Upgrades and Cost Reduction," Working Papers 31, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
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