This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

On the Notion of Social Institutions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Carmona, Guilherme

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We argue that it is natural to study social institutions within the framework of standard game theory (i.e., only by resorting to concepts like players, actions, strategies, information sets, payoff functions, and stochastic processes describing the moves of nature, which constitute a stochastic game when combined)  concepts like social norms, and mechanisms can be easily accommodated, as well as philosophical/ sociological definitions of social institutions Focusing on strategies rather than on mechanisms have two advantages: First, focusing on strategies allows us to distinguish between those aspects that are behavioral in nature and are subject to alternative design, and those that are part of the environment. Second, considering strategies allows for a more detailed look into the way an outcome function is genuinely implemented (Hurwicz (1996, p.123)).

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2002/wp421.pdf
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp421.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp421

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.fe.unl.pt

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Lourdes Gouveia).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. North, Douglass C, 1991. "Institutions," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 97-112, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1995. "Social Norms and Random Matching Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 79-109, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? All RePEc services are meant to be be free forever, as they are all run by volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-31.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.