Burden Sharing At The Imf

In the context of the financial governance of the International Monetary Fund, what are the equity implications of the way in which the IMF distributes the cost of running its regular (non-concessionary) lending operations as well as how it funds its concessionary lending and debt relief operations? While the IMF charges borrowers roughly what it pays its creditor members for the resources used in its regular lending operations, its overhead costs (administrative budget plus addition to reserves) are shared between the two groups of members in a less equitable manner. With overhead costs rising inexorably to meet the increasing number and range of responsibilities being placed on the institution – largely at the instance of the IMF‘s principal creditors by virtue of their dominant majority of voting power – the under-representation of the IMF’s debtors undermines the legitimacy of its decision making. With regard to the concessionary lending and debt relief operations, some of the IMF’s funding modalities have involved a substantial contribution by IMF debtors, sometimes under pressure. While this has been accepted as part of an intra-developing-country burden-sharing exercise, it has also significantly reduced the cost to developed countries of meeting their responsibilities to the poorest members of the international community.