IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ums/papers/2013-01.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Power, Luck and Ideology in a Model of Executive Pay

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Skott

    (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

  • Frederick Guy

    (University of London)

Abstract

The microprocessor and related technologies have transformed corporate and industry structure; applied in a neo?liberal environment, the technologies have had profound effects on the relative power of different groups. Skott and Guy (2007) and Guy and Skott (2008) formalized one aspect of this process of power?biased technical change: firms' increased ability to monitor low?paid employees and the resulting changes in inequality and employment at the low end of the income distribution. This paper addresses power biases and income inequality at the high end. Increasing firm?level financial volatility has intensified the agency problem and increased the power of corporate executives. These effects, which have been compounded by changes in ideology and pay norms, yielded an explosion in executive pay. JEL Categories: J31, O33

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Skott & Frederick Guy, 2013. "Power, Luck and Ideology in a Model of Executive Pay," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2013-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2013-01
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/2013-01.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. James Crotty, 2009. "The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial Instability," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2009-13, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yoshihara, Naoki & Veneziani, Roberto, 2018. "The Theory Of Exploitation As The Unequal Exchange Of Labour," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 381-409, November.
    2. Leila E. Davis, 2013. "Financialization and the nonfinancial corporation: an investigation of firmlevel investment behavior in the U.S., 1971-2011," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2013-08, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    3. Kim, Hyeon-Kyeong & Skott, Peter, 2014. "Labor market reform and wage inequality in Korea," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2014-13, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jean Arcand & Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, 2015. "Too much finance?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 105-148, June.
    2. Olivier Godechot, 2011. "Finance and the rise in inequalities in France," Working Papers halshs-00584881, HAL.
    3. James Crotty, 2010. "The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Financial Instability (revised)," Working Papers wp209_revised3, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
    4. Stefan Andrei NESTIAN, 2017. "The Perverse Incentive €“ A General Concern In Managerial Systems," Proceedings of the INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 11(1), pages 905-917, November.
    5. Krishnan Sharma, 2012. "Financial sector compensation and excess risk-taking—a consideration of the issues and policy lessons," Working Papers 115, United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    communications technology; power-biased technical change; inequality; executive pay; efficiency wage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2013-01. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Daniele Girardi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/deumaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.