Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are good laws a substitute for good citizens?
AbstractLaws and policies designed to harness self-regarding preferences to public ends may fail when they compromise the beneficial effects of pro-social preferences. Experimental evidence indicates that incentives that appeal to self interest may reduce the salience of intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, and other civic motives. Motivational crowding in also occurs. The evidence for these processes is reviewed and a model of optimal explicit incentives is presented. JEL Categories: D64, D52, H41, H21, Z13, C92
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers with number 2007-04.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision: Mar 2008
Social preferences; implementation theory; incentive contracts; incomplete contracts; framing; behavioral experiments; motivational crowding out; ethical norms; constitutions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- D52 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Incomplete Markets
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-02-10 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2007-02-10 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2007-02-10 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-02-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-02-10 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2007-02-10 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-02-10 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Bernasconi, Michele & Corazzini, Luca & Marenzi, Anna, 2013.
"‘Expressive’ obligations in public good games: Crowding-in and crowding-out effects,"
Research in Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 13-24.
- Michele Bernasconi & Luca Corazzini & Anna Marenzi, 2010. "‘Expressive’ Obligations in Public Good Games: Crowding-in and Crowding-out Effects," Working Papers 2010_04, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
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