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An asymmetric dynamic struggle between pirates and producers

Author

Listed:
  • Alex Coram

    (Robert Gordon University, Scotland, and The University of Western Australia)

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of struggles over resources by studying a game between a producer that can guard and buy fortifications and a pirate. It is assumed that the returns from defence and raiding depends on the ratio of the resources spent on each activity and that all produced goods can be stolen. It attempts to characterise the trajectory of the resources and the defence and raiding activities of the pirate and producer. I show, among other things, that the pirate’s strategy is to farm the producer and that the pirate’s raiding activities and resources will decline as the productive capacity of the producer increases. I also show that a flexible guarding strategy may be preferred to fixed fortifications if the producer’s resources are low at any time. JEL Categories: C61, C72, P14, D00.

Suggested Citation

  • Alex Coram, 2006. "An asymmetric dynamic struggle between pirates and producers," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2006-07, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2006-07
    as

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    File URL: http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/2006-07.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource struggles; piracy; differential games; optimal control.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General

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