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Optimal Parochialism: The Dynamics of Trust and Exclusion in Networks

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  • Samuel Bowles

    ()
    (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

  • Herbert Gintis

    ()

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    Abstract

    Networks such as ethnic credit associations, close-knit residential neighborhoods, 'old boy' networks, and ethnically linked businesses play an important role in economic life but have been little studied by economists. These networks are often supported by cultural distinctions between insiders and outsiders and engage in exclusionary practices which we call parochialism. We provide an economic analysis of parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders. We first model one-shot social interactions among self-regarding agents, demonstrating that trust (i.e., cooperating without using information about one's trading partner) is a best response in a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium if the quality of information about one's partner is sufficiently high. We show that since larger networks have lower quality information about specific individuals and greater trading opportunities, there may be an optimal (payoff-maximizing) network size. We then model the growth and decline of networks, as well as their equilibrium size and number. We show that in the absence of parochialism, networks may not exist, and the appropriate level of parochialism may implement an optimal network size. Finally, we explore the welfare implications and reasons for the evolutionary success of exclusion on parochial and other grounds.

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    File URL: http://www.umass.edu/economics/publications/econ2000_06.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers with number 2000-06.

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    Date of creation: 16 Feb 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:ums:papers:2000-06

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    1. Craig, Ben & Pencavel, John, 1992. "The Behavior of Worker Cooperatives: The Plywood Companies of the Pacific Northwest," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1083-105, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Alan Kirman & Sheri Markose & Simone Giasante & Paolo Pin, 2007. "Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks," Economics Discussion Papers 629, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00971684 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Brian S. Collins & Robin Mansell, 2004. "Cyber trust and crime prevention: a synthesis of the state-of-the-art science reviews," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4252, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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