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When Do Input Prices Matter For Make-Or-Buy Decisions?

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Author Info
David Mandy () (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia)
Abstract

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient make-or-buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. A necessary and sufficient condition for efficient make-or-buy decisions is derived. This condition shows that input prices are relevant for make-or-buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient make-or-buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient make-or-buy decisions depends on the relative efficiency of the incumbent and the demand displacement ratio, with significant departures possible even for modest efficiency differences when products are nearly homogeneous.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0701.

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Length: 14 pgs.
Date of creation: 16 Jan 2007
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Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0701

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Related research
Keywords: Input Pricing Policy; Productive Efficiency.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x.
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. David E. M Sappington, 2005. "On the Irrelevance of Input Prices for Make-or-Buy Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1631-1638, December. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509.
  5. Blank, Larry & Kaserman, David L & Mayo, John W, 1998. "Dominant Firm Pricing with Competitive Entry and Regulation: The Case of IntraLATA Toll," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 35-53, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Topkis Donald M., 1995. "Comparative Statics of the Firm," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 370-401, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
  9. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Access pricing and competition," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1673-1710, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Armstrong, Mark & Doyle, Chris & Vickers, John, 1996. "The Access Pricing Problem: A Synthesis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2), pages 131-50, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Weisman, Dennis L, 1995. "Regulation and the Vertically Integrated Firm: The Case of RBOC Entry into Interlata Long Distance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-66, November.
  12. Mark Armstrong, 2001. "Access Pricing, Bypass, and Universal Service," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 297-301, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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