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On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation

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Author Info
X. Henry Wang () (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia)
Judy Hsu
Abstract

This paper uses a three-stage licensing-delegation-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

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File URL: http://economics.missouri.edu/working-papers/2004/wp0416_wang.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Missouri in its series Working Papers with number 0416.

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Length: 19 pgs.
Date of creation: 23 Dec 2004
Date of revision: 23 Dec 2004
Handle: RePEc:umc:wpaper:0416

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Related research
Keywords: licensing; strategic delegation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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  1. Lin, Ping, 1996. "Fixed-Fee Licensing of Innovations and Collusion," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 443-49, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.

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