IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/uma/periwp/wp273.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord and the Construction of the Post-War Monetary Regime in the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Gerald Epstein
  • Juliet Schor

Abstract

This previously published, but now out-of-print paper addresses the circumstances surrounding the ‘Federal Reserve - Treasury Accord of 1951. We want to make it available now because of the current intense focus on the role of the Federal Reserve in the financial crisis, which has raised serious questions about its governance. Some critics —particularly those aligned with Congressman Ron Paul — want to "end the Fed." A much better approach, however, is to democratize the Federal Reserve. Democratizing the Fed is not a hypothetical scenario. As our paper discusses, during the Second World War, the Federal Reserve was largely under the control of the U.S. government — particularly the Executive Branch and especially the Treasury Department. In these conditions, Federal Reserve policy was highly coordinated with fiscal policy and contributed significantly to the war effort. Following the Second World War, financial interests and the Fed itself pushed very hard to make it more independent of the elected government, and to make it dependent on and subservient to the financial sector. This is the Federal Reserve we are once again living with today. The paper suggests putting true democratic control of the Federal Reserve back on the policy agenda, rather than protecting its capture by finance, or "ending the fed" and putting the economy back into the straight jacket of a gold standard, which helped throw the world into the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerald Epstein & Juliet Schor, 2011. "The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord and the Construction of the Post-War Monetary Regime in the United States," Working Papers wp273, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
  • Handle: RePEc:uma:periwp:wp273
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://per.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_papers/working_papers_251-300/WP273.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uma:periwp:wp273. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Judy Fogg (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/permaus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.