This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Intellectual property in a knowledge-based economy : Patents to include vs. patents to exclude Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Patrick Cohendet
Matthieu Farcot
Julien Pénin
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
The traditional perception of patents puts the emphasis on their importance to exclude imitators and to restore incentives to invent. This view is far too restrictive and at variance with many empirical and theoretical works. We show that these contradictions can be overcome by shifting from a traditional economic framework to a knowledge-based one. Such a move allows a renewed economic perception of patents, making them into essential instruments which serve not only to exclude potential infringers but also to “include” all the different stakeholders in the innovation process. Within this new approach the main role of the patent system is therefore to ensure the coordination among heterogeneous actors and to structure innovation activities. We illustrate our view by presenting the four polar cases of pharmaceuticals, electronics, software and biotechnologies.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number
2009-15.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract ),
plain text
(with abstract ),
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-15Contact details of provider: Postal: PEGE. 61, Aven. de la For�t-Noire 67000 Strasbourg Phone: +33 3 90 24 20 69 Fax: +33 3 90 24 20 71 Email: Web page: http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Keywords: Intellectual property rights ; incentives ; coordination ; R&D collaboration ; collective invention. ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Mowery, David C. & Ziedonis, Arvids A., 2002.
"Academic patent quality and quantity before and after the Bayh-Dole act in the United States ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 399-418, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lanjouw, Jean O & Lerner, Josh, 2001.
"Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 573-603, October.
Mansfield, Edwin & Schwartz, Mark & Wagner, Samuel, 1981.
"Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 907-18, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carl Shapiro, 2000.
"Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting ,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
CPC00-011, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Carl Shapiro, 2003.
"Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting ,"
Law and Economics
0303005, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Carl Shapiro, 2004.
"Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard Setting ,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000000539, David K. Levine.
[Downloadable!] Carl Shapiro, 2001.
"Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 1, pages 119-150
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987.
"Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development ,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity ,
Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(1987-3), pages 783-832.
[Downloadable!]
Cowan, Robin & Foray, Dominique, 1997.
"The Economics of Codification and the Diffusion of Knowledge ,"
Industrial and Corporate Change ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 6(3), pages 595-622, September.
Kenneth Arrow, 1962.
"Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention ,"
NBER Chapters ,
in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!]
Arundel, Anthony & Kabla, Isabelle, 1998.
"What percentage of innovations are patented? empirical estimates for European firms ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 127-141, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Akerlof, George A, 1970.
"The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kingston, William, 2001.
"Innovation needs patents reform ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 403-423, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
David, Paul A, 1985.
"Clio and the Economics of QWERTY ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 332-37, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Arundel, Anthony, 2001.
"The relative effectiveness of patents and secrecy for appropriation ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 611-624, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Mazzoleni, Roberto & Nelson, Richard R., 1998.
"The benefits and costs of strong patent protection: a contribution to the current debate ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 273-284, July.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ordover, Janusz A, 1991.
"A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cowan, Robin & David, Paul A & Foray, Dominique, 2000.
"The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness ,"
Industrial and Corporate Change ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 211-53, June.
Other versions:
Robin Cowan & Paul A. David & Dominique Foray, 1999.
"The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness ,"
Working Papers
99027, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Cowan,Robin & David,Paul & Foray,Dominique, 1999.
"The Explicit Economics of Knowledge Codification and Tacitness ,"
Research Memoranda
025, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology.
[Downloadable!] Harhoff, Dietmar & Reitzig, Markus, 2004.
"Determinants of opposition against EPO patent grants--the case of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 443-480, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Kortum, Samuel & Lerner, Josh, 1999.
"What is behind the recent surge in patenting?1 ,"
Research Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-22, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? IDEAS is also providing many rankings , for example of authors and institutions.
This page was last updated on 2009-11-9.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .