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The incentive properties of the Matthew Effect in the academic competition

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Author Info
Nicolas Carayol

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the incentive properties of the Matthew Effect by which since Merton [1968] one is usually describing the various cumulative advantages that obviously affect academic competition. We introduce a model of sequential contests in which the agents that have initially produced more are the ones that will be further advantaged in that they are benefiting from intrinsically more productive research positions. We principally show that there is an optimal level of the Matthew effect and that this optimal dynamic bias is increasing with the risk of research activity while it is decreasing with the initial inequalities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2003-11.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2003-11

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Related research
Keywords: Matthew Effect; cumulative advantages; sequential contests; academic competition.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)

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