The incentive properties of the Matthew Effect in the academic competition
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the incentive properties of the Matthew Eﬀect by which since Merton  one is usually describing the various cumulative advantages that obviously affect academic competition. We introduce a model of sequential contests in which the agents that have initially produced more are the ones that will be further advantaged in that they are benefiting from intrinsically more productive research positions. We principally show that there is an optimal level of the Matthew effect and that this optimal dynamic bias is increasing with the risk of research activity while it is decreasing with the initial inequalities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2003-11.
Date of creation: 2003
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Matthew Effect; cumulative advantages; sequential contests; academic competition.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
- J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)
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