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On renegotiation design

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  • Mathias Dewatripont
  • Philippe Aghion
  • Patrick Rey

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/9577.

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Date of creation: 1990
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Publication status: Published in: European Economic Review (1990) v.34,p.322-329
Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/9577

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Cited by:
  1. Kumkar, Lars, 1998. "Privatwirtschaftliche Koordinierungsstrukturen in vertikal strukturierten Industrien: Eine Analyse der Stromwirtschaft auf Grundlage der neuen Institutionenökonomik," Kiel Working Papers 873, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  3. Antras, Pol, 2005. "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle," Scholarly Articles 3196324, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Jan Y. Sand, 2009. "Efficiency in complementary partnerships with competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(1), pages 57-70.
  5. Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Pol Antràs, 2003. "Firms, Contracts, And Trade Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1375-1418, November.
  8. Sloof, Randolph & Sonnemans, Joep & Oosterbeek, Hessel, 2004. "Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1399-1410, December.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  10. Acharya, Viral V. & John, Kose & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 2000. "On the optimality of resetting executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 65-101, July.
  11. Zhu, Tian, 2000. "Holdups, simple contracts and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 549-560, August.

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