Leadership in a Weak-Link Game
AbstractWe investigate, experimentally, the effects of leadership in a four player weak-link game. A weak-link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. Previous studies have shown that leadership by example - in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group - can lead to increased cooperation in collective action problems and we are interested in finding out whether this result extends to weak-link games. Our results suggest that leadership has no effect on initial behavior; the first time that they play the game participants behave the same with leadership as without. We also observe, however, that leadership can allow groups to raise efficiency over time and therefore overcome inefficiency. There doesn't appear to be a difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are (randomly) appointed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Kent in its series Studies in Economics with number 0914.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Kent at Canterbury, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-11-27 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2009-11-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2009-11-27 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-11-27 (Game Theory)
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