In this paper we propose the state of art in the theory of coalitional games in effectiveness form without bargaining between coalitions. We study some solution concepts: The largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994); the largest cautious consistent set (Mauleon et al., 2004); the credible consistent set (Bhattacharya, 2002); standard stable behaviors (Xue, 1998). A series of examples, showing main features and differences between these solutions, are presented in order to outline some drawbacks and positive aspects in the philosophical framework of stability concepts.
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Paper provided by Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia in its series Quaderni DSEMS with number
11-2009.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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