Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A Political Economy Approach to Resource Taxation: Weak Sustainability, Revenue Recycling and Regional Planning

Contents:

Author Info

  • Massimiliano Mazzanti

    ()

  • Roberto Zoboli

Abstract

We present conceptual and empirical insights on the issue of resource taxation, an intrinsic regional environmental policy. It deals with the implementation of environmental taxes and environmental planning at regional level, as tools aimed at achieving weak sustainability for non renewable resources like aggregates, extracted for a diverse set of economic aims. We frame the discussion in the spirit of refreshing the need of ecological and resource tax reforms at national and regional level-. We do note and discuss the intrinsic peculiarities of resource taxes with respect to emission taxes, namely the integration with regional planning, the use of revenue for weak sustainability objectives, the different role by played technology and efficiency. Factors that are to be taken into account in any specific implementation. We empirically investigate resource taxation issues by focusing on aggregate extraction management and policy of two large Northern Italian regions, Lombardy and Emilia-Romagna. We conclude that the possible effects of extraction charges for the aggregate market development in Italy can be very limited. The level of charges is generally too low to be expected to have an effect on demand (through aggregate prices) and supply of aggregates. The environmental objectives of planning are, at least for the moment, other than reducing extraction, and they generally consist of minimising external impacts, to support sustainable management of landscapes, and to provide multi-value public goods within the local area. The evidence shows that even more for resource taxes a political economy analysis that encompasses institutional and planning issues is needed to effectively shape environmental policies. The complementarity of land use planning and economic instruments is a key driver of sustainability performances and witness reciprocal influences. The unintended effects of economic instruments are also a crucial thing for evaluating effectiveness and efficiency. Those include positive effects of ‘institutional kind’ on the governance and organizational performance of the integrated policy-planning framework.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://out.economia.unife.it/uploads/dip_deit/quaderni/201202.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Ferrara, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 201202.

as in new window
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udf:wpaper:201202

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Voltapaletto, 11 - I-44121 Ferrara (Italy)
Phone: +39 0532 455006
Fax: +39 0532 205349
Web page: http://dipem.economia.unife.it/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Resource tax reforms; aggregates; environmental charges; regional planning; sustainability; ex post compensations; Political economy; unintended effects; environmental federalism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kirk Hamilton & Giovanni Ruta & Liaila Tajibaeva, 2006. "Capital Accumulation and Resource Depletion: A Hartwick Rule Counterfactual," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 34(4), pages 517-533, August.
  2. Paul Ekins & Philip Summerton & Chris Thoung & Daniel Lee, 2011. "A Major Environmental Tax Reform for the UK: Results for the Economy, Employment and the Environment," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(3), pages 447-474, November.
  3. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2008. "Why Do Many Resource-Rich Countries Have Negative Genuine Saving? Anticipation of Better Times or Rapacious Rent Seeking," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Aidt, Toke S., 2010. "Green taxes: Refunding rules and lobbying," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-43, July.
  5. Lucas Bretschger & Simone Valente, 2010. "Endogenous Growth, Asymmetric Trade and Resource Taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich 10/132, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  6. Bento, Antonio M. & Jacobsen, Mark, 2007. "Ricardian rents, environmental policy and the `double-dividend' hypothesis," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 17-31, January.
  7. Groth, Christian & Schou, Poul, 2007. "Growth and non-renewable resources: The different roles of capital and resource taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 80-98, January.
  8. Kolstad, Ivar & Wiig, Arne, 2009. "It's the rents, stupid! The political economy of the resource curse," Energy Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5317-5325, December.
  9. Elissaios Papyrakis & Reyer Gerlagh, 2004. "Resource-Abundance and Economic Growth in the U.S," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2004.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  10. Karen Pittel & Lucas Bretschger, 2008. "Sectoral Heterogeneity, Resource Depletion, and Directed Technical Change: Theory and Policy," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich 08/96, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  11. Segal, Paul, 2011. "Resource Rents, Redistribution, and Halving Global Poverty: The Resource Dividend," World Development, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 475-489, April.
  12. Patuelli, Roberto & Nijkamp, Peter & Pels, Eric, 2005. "Environmental tax reform and the double dividend: A meta-analytical performance assessment," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 564-583, December.
  13. John Thornton & Fabian Bornhorst & Sanjeev Gupta, 2008. "Natural Resource Endowments, Governance, and the Domestic Revenueeffort," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 08/170, International Monetary Fund.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:udf:wpaper:201202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alberto Benati).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.