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Relational Contracts, Reputation Capital, and Explicit Contracts: Evidence from Information Technology Outsourcing

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Lan Shi
Anjana Susarla
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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2008-16.

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Date of creation: Aug 2008
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Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2008-16

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  1. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Gibbons, Robert, 2005. "Four forma(lizable) theories of the firm?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 200-245, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, 2000. "Reputation Effects And The Limits Of Contracting: A Study Of The Indian Software Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 989-1017, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2007. "Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 45(3), pages 595-628, September.
  6. Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, 1993. "The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(1), pages 126-146, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Arturs Kalnins, 2004. "Relationships and Hybrid Contracts: An Analysis of Contract Choice in Information Technology," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 207-229, April.
  8. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
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  9. Kenneth S. Corts, 2004. "The Effect of Repeated Interaction on Contract Choice: Evidence from Offshore Drilling," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 230-260, April.
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