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Contracts in Bureaucracies Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Fahad Khalil
Doyoung Kim
Jacques Lawarree
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Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
UWEC-2008-08.
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Date of creation: May 2008Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2008-08Contact details of provider: Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330 Email: Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/ More information through EDIRC
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005.
"Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents ,"
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"Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Economic Incentives? ,"
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Canice Prendergast, 2007.
"The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats ,"
American Economic Review ,
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[Downloadable!]
Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
Other versions:
AGHION, Philippe & TIROLE, Jean, 1994.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations ,"
IDEI Working Papers
37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations ,"
Working papers
95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Normal and Real Authority in Organizations ,"
Working papers
94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1989.
"Agency Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 27(3), pages 431-51, July.
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