Nationalization of Energy Assets and Regional Welfare; Sakhalin 2007
AbstractBetween 2001 and 2007, rising prices of oil and gas provided a gigantic domestic windfall for Russia’s government in the form of export duties and resource taxes. However, the windfall created incentives for the federal government to re-capture control rights to natural resource stocks. Thus, the past four years have seen a substantial transfer of effective ownership from private firms to government control. This study explores why multinationals were willing to commit billions of dollars of FDI to a remote Russian island in the North Pacific. It asks how the de facto re-nationalization of energy assets will impact the availability of advanced technologies, investment efficiency, and environmental risks to the North Pacific fishery.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2007-36.
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2007-12-19 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2007-12-19 (Environmental Economics)
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