Do Russian federal expenditures serve to reduce regional inequality, to insure against exogenous shocks, or to compensate regions for low tax capacity? Do sub-national governments appear to engage in strategic behavior in attempting to influence central governmental transfers? Using a panel data base coving Russia’s regions during the period after the Russian financial crisis, we find that federal administrative employment in a region has a strong positive effect on federal transfers to the region, but that there is little evidence that federal expenditures serve to reduce levels of regional inequality and no evidence that changes in federal transfers respond to changes in “social needs” during the period studied.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
UWEC-2007-34.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Goldblatt).
Related research
Keywords:
Other versions of this item:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)