The Color of Law: An Economic Theory of Legal Boundaries
AbstractThis paper presents an economic theory of property, tort, and contract law based on the goal of efficiently governing economic exchange relationships. In the theory, legal boundaries emerge endogenously in response to exogenous differences in the nature of the underlying transaction concerning the possible existence of unforeseen or non-contractible contingencies, and/or the desire of one of the parties to make non-salvageable investments prior to trade. The analysis asks whether, in this context, the transaction is best governed by property, tort, or contract principles. The conclusions are illustrated by a discussion of several cases that occupy the “boundaries” between the various areas.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2013-17.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Property; torts; contracts; legal boundaries;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
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ULB Institutional Repository
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