Tribalism as a Minimax-Regret Strategy: Evidence from Voting in the 2007 Kenyan Elections
AbstractAlthough many studies find that voting in Africa approximates an ethnic census in that voting is primarily along ethnic lines, hardly any of the studies have sought to explain ethnic voting following a rational choice framework. Using data of voter opinions from a survey conducted two weeks before the December 2007 Kenyan elections, we find that the expected benefits associated with a win by each of the presidential candidates varied significantly across voters from different ethnic groups. We hypothesize that decision to participate in the elections was influenced by the expected benefits as per the minimax-regret voting model. We test the predictions of this model using data of voter turnout in the December 2007 elections and find that turnout across ethnic groups varied systematically with expected benefits. The results suggest that individuals participated in the elections primarily to avoid the maximum regret should a candidate from another ethnic group win. The results therefore offer credence to the minimax regret model as proposed by Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) and refute the Downsian expected utility model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2008-35.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
Economics of Voting; Voting Paradox; Minimax-regret; Ethnic Divisions;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2008-10-07 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2008-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-10-07 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2008-10-07 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum,"
2008-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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- Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
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