Tax Motivated Takings
AbstractTax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-43.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
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Eminent domain; holdout problem; property taxes; takings; urban redevelopment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-GEO-2007-11-17 (Economic Geography)
- NEP-LAW-2007-11-17 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-11-17 (Public Economics)
- NEP-URE-2007-11-17 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2006.
"A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings,"
2006-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007.
- Thomas Miceli, 2011.
"Free riders, holdouts, and public use: a tale of two externalities,"
Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 105-117, July.
- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Free Riders, Holdouts, and Public Use: A Tale of Two Externalities," Working papers 2009-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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