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Tax Motivated Takings

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Author Info
Thomas J. Miceli (University of Connecticut)
Kathleen Segerson (University of Connecticut)
C. F. Sirmans (University of Connecticut)

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Abstract

Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.

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File URL: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2007-43.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-43.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-43

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Related research
Keywords: Eminent domain; holdout problem; property taxes; takings; urban redevelopment;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
R51 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Thomas Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2006. "A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings," Working papers 2006-22, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2007. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-24.


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