From Tranquility to Secession and Other Historical Sequences: A Theoretical Exposition
AbstractA model is developed explaining many common historical sequences: inter alia, the rise and fall of empires, expansion or contraction in the geographic size of nations, wars of secession, non-contested secessions, and growth of supra-national unions. The basic unit of analysis is a transaction in international (or national) law that verifies and legitimizes transformations from one organizational entity to another. Decision-makers for national, or super-national entities as well as those at sub-levels are assumed to be welfare maximizers under cost constraints. Potential secessionists face dispute costs, and decision-makers for the higher-level entity incur persuasion costs. Both costs may include military expenses. These transaction costs are shown to play a crucial role in determining the optimal number of independent countries in the world.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-35.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
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autonomous regions; causes of war; civil war; clash of civilizations; collapse of empire; economic union; empire; end of history; federalism; human rights; international borders; secession; self determination; theory of history; transaction costs; unitary state; war of secession.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
- K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
- N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
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- Paul Hallwood, 2008. "Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom," Working papers 2008-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
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