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From Tranquility to Secession and Other Historical Sequences: A Theoretical Exposition

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  • Paul Hallwood

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

A model is developed explaining many common historical sequences: inter alia, the rise and fall of empires, expansion or contraction in the geographic size of nations, wars of secession, non-contested secessions, and growth of supra-national unions. The basic unit of analysis is a transaction in international (or national) law that verifies and legitimizes transformations from one organizational entity to another. Decision-makers for national, or super-national entities as well as those at sub-levels are assumed to be welfare maximizers under cost constraints. Potential secessionists face dispute costs, and decision-makers for the higher-level entity incur persuasion costs. Both costs may include military expenses. These transaction costs are shown to play a crucial role in determining the optimal number of independent countries in the world.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2007-35.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-35

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Related research

Keywords: autonomous regions; causes of war; civil war; clash of civilizations; collapse of empire; economic union; empire; end of history; federalism; human rights; international borders; secession; self determination; theory of history; transaction costs; unitary state; war of secession.;

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References

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  1. R. Boadway, 2004. "Book Reviews," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 95-98, 09.
  2. Grossman, Herschel I, 1999. "Kleptocracy and Revolutions," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 267-83, April.
  3. J. Wesley Leckrone, 2004. "Book Reviews," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Oxford University Press, vol. 34(4), pages 264-173, Fall.
  4. N. H. Bingham, 2004. "Book reviews," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 167(4), pages 767-768.
  5. N. H. Bingham, 2004. "Book reviews," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 167(4), pages 761-762.
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Cited by:
  1. Paul Hallwood, 2008. "Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom," Working papers 2008-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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