Property Condition Disclosure Law: Why Did States Mandate 'Seller Tell All'?
AbstractThirty-six US states have already enacted some form of seller's property condition disclosure law. At a time when there is a movement in this direction nationally, this paper attempts to ascertain the factors that lead states to adopt disclosure law. Motivation for the study stems from the fact that not all states have yet adopted the law, and states that have enacted the law have done so in different years. The analytical structure employs hazard models, using a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years, from 1984 to 2004. The proportional hazard analysis of law adoption reveals that greater number of disciplinary actions tends to favor passage of the law. Greater broker supervision, implying generally higher awareness among real estate agents, seems to have a negative impact on the likelihood of a state adopting a property condition disclosure law.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2006-16.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2006
Date of revision:
Note: This paper is adapted from the first chapter of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. I would like to thank my advisors, Stephen L. Ross, John M. Clapp, and Dennis R. Heffley for their insightful comments on the idea and methodology. I would also like to thank Tim Storey (National Conference of State Legislatures), Daniel Conti (Bureau of Labor Statistics) for assistance with data. All remaining errors are mine.
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Postal: University of Connecticut 341 Mansfield Road, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063
Phone: (860) 486-4889
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Web page: http://www.econ.uconn.edu/
More information through EDIRC
Property Condition Disclosure; Law Adoption; Hazard Analysis; Housing Price Index;
Other versions of this item:
- Anupam Nanda, 2008. "Property Condition Disclosure Law: Why Did States Mandate ‘Seller Tell All’?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 131-146, August.
- C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-07-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-REG-2006-07-02 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2006-07-02 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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