Corn Market Dynamics and the Joint Executive Committee (1880 - 1886)
AbstractWe incorporate previously omitted controls of external conditions in transportation and commodity markets into Porter’s (1983) analysis of industry demand, conduct and stability of the JEC railroad cartel. We estimate the equilibrium price path, non-parametrically, and find that the reaction of the JEC in its rate setting to the nature of rate setting, over alternative modes of conveyance, is very much predicted by the theoretical considerations in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). Periods of Cartel instability are triggered by unexpected booms in corn markets in New York, amongst other factors. The latter is consistent with the Green and Porter (1984) theory.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Geary Institute, University College Dublin in its series Working Papers with number 200923.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 16 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Corn Market Spot and Future Weekly Prices in Chicago and New York; Demand Cycles; Inventory Management in New York; JEC Railroad Cartel Pricing; Outside Transportation Options; Structural Modeling.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-16 (All new papers)
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