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Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Robert M. Anderson and Walter Trockel and Lin Zhou.
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In an nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas- Colell bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large finite NTU exchange economies.
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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number
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Date of creation: 01 Jan 1994Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:94-224Contact details of provider: Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA Phone: 510-642-0822 Fax: 510-642-6615 Email: Web page: http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/iber/wps/econwp.html More information through EDIRC
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Chiaki Hara, 2004.
"Bargaining Set and Anonymous Core without the Monotonicity Assumption ,"
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Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z., 2004.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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