Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
Abstract
In an nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economy with a continuum of agents, the Mas- Colell bargaining set coincides with the set of Walrasian equilibria. In this paper, we show that the Mas-Colell bargaining set, as well as a smaller bargaining set due to Zhou, may fail to converge to competitive outcomes in large finite NTU exchange economies.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 94-224.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:94-224
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Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Robert M. Anderson & Walter Trockel & Lin Zhou, 1997. "Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1227-1240, September.
- Robert M. Anderson & Walter Tockel & Lin Zhou, 1994. "Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets," Game Theory and Information 9403001, EconWPA.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2000.
"On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0141, Econometric Society.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 2001. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1685-1696, November.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 011, Oscar Volij.
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra & Oscar Volij, 1999. "On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 99-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Sun,N. & Trockel,W. & Yang,Z., 2004.
"Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game,"
Working Papers
358, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Sun, Ning & Trockel, Walter & Yang, Zaifu, 2008. "Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an n-person game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 853-860, July.
- Sun, N. & Trockel, W. & Yang, Z.F., 2004. "Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game," Discussion Paper 2004-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Hara, Chiaki, 2005.
"Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(4-5), pages 545-556, August.
- Chiaki Hara, 2004. "Bargaining Set and Anonymous Core without the Monotonicity Assumption," KIER Working Papers 599, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Kovalenkov, Alexander, 2002. "Simple Strategy-Proof Approximately Walrasian Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 475-487, April.
- Hara, Chiaki, 2002. "The anonymous core of an exchange economy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 91-116, September.
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