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Adverse Selection, Short-Term Contracting, and the Underprovision of On-the-Job Training

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Author Info
Benjamin Hermalin.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 90-139.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 1990
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:90-139

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  1. Tirole, Jean, 2008. "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," IDEI Working Papers 453, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. James Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 086, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-35, Spring. [Downloadable!]
  4. Antonio Nicolo' & Piero Tedeschi, 2004. "Missing Contracts: On the Rationality of not Signing a Prenuptial Agreement," Game Theory and Information 0406001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Stefano Comino & Antonio Nicolò & Piero Tedeschi, 2005. "Termination Clauses in Partnerships," Industrial Organization 0509007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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