Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 8620.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 1986
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Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
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Other versions of this item:
- Joseph Farrell & Bob Gibbons, 1986. "Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games," Working papers 422, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1986. "Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt1vq3k8mj, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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- Karl Iorio & Alejandro M. Manuelli, 1990. "Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games," Discussion Papers 915, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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