This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Efficacy of Insider Trading Regulation

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Matthew Spiegel and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam.
Abstract

Regulatory authorities often lack a "smoking gun" (i.e., hard evidence such as a note or a memorandum) when prosecuting individuals for illegal insider trading. As a result, many insider trading cases depend solely on circumstantial evidence, which is usually obtained by associating trades with "unusual" price moves. However, insiders with the most accurate information (the ones most likely to possess "material, non-public" information) are the ones best able to modify their trading strategy in response to prosecution strategies based on price moves. This is a major obstacle to the efficacy of insider trading regulation. Thus, if legislation discourages strategic insiders with relatively precise information from trading, then in all likelihood any investor who is prosecuted will possess only the weakest (most imprecise) information. Stratetgic behavior by insiders in response to insider trading regulations can thereby lead to a situation where the pool of prosecuted traders contains a large fraction of innocent individuals (i.e., individuals with relatively poor information).

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Research Program in Finance Working Papers with number RPF-257.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbrf:rpf-257

Contact details of provider:
Postal: University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA
Phone: 510-642-0822
Fax: 510-642-6615
Email:
Web page: http://haas.berkeley.edu/finance/WP/rpflist.html
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: IBER, F502 Haas Building, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley CA 94720-1922
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2009-6-20.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.